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REFORMING THE CONTESTED CONVENTION:  
RETHINKING THE PRESIDENTIAL 
NOMINATION PROCESS 
Michael T. Morley* 
 
The presidential nomination process used by the Democratic and 
Republican Parties is an ill-considered, unstable pastiche of competing 
components that generally operate in fundamentally different manners.  The 
process is comprised of three main elements:  the selection of delegates to 
the national convention (generally through state and district party 
conventions or other intraparty processes), the determination of the 
presidential candidates for whom those delegates will vote (generally 
through state-by-state primaries and caucuses), and the national 
convention itself. 
The ritual of holding primary elections and caucuses across the nation 
creates the widespread public expectation that the results of those 
proceedings—the will of the voters—will determine who wins each party’s 
nomination.  Yet, the national convention need not nominate the 
presidential candidate who received the most votes nationwide, won the 
most delegates, or prevailed in the most primaries or caucuses.  The system 
gives delegates substantial power over both the rules of the convention and 
the choice of nominee that, were it ever used, could lead to the collapse of a 
party.  And the mere existence of this power leads to suspicion of the party 
establishment, intraparty intrigue and discord, and uncertainty throughout 
the primary process, which are unhealthy for both the party and the 
country. 
The presidential nomination process could be substantially improved 
through a few minor tweaks that would reduce unnecessary uncertainty, 
bolster its democratic underpinnings, and improve the connections among 
its various components.  First, certain fundamental rules governing 
national conventions should be determined well in advance of the 
presidential nominating process, before any primaries or caucuses are held 
or delegates selected, and not be subject to change or suspension at the 
convention itself.  Second, parties should enhance the democratic moorings 
 
*  Assistant Professor, Barry University School of Law. Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on 
Law, Harvard Law School, 2012–14; J.D., 2003, Yale Law School; A.B., 2000, Princeton 
University.  Special thanks to Bob Bauer, Anthony Gaughan, Derek T. Muller, and John 
Ryder, as well as the participants at the forum entitled Election Law and the Presidency held 
at Fordham University School of Law, for their comments, questions, and feedback.  I am 
also grateful to the staff of the Fordham Law Review for their tireless assistance in editing 
this piece and to Rebecca Miller for her invaluable research assistance. 
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of their national conventions by requiring presidential candidates to win a 
greater number of presidential preference votes to be placed into 
nomination.  Third, state parties should tie the various components of the 
presidential nomination process more closely together by adopting a blend 
of the Democratic and Republican Parties’ current approaches.  When a 
candidate is allotted national convention delegates based on the results of a 
presidential preference vote, the candidate should have a voice in selecting 
those delegates, and those delegates in turn should be bound to vote for that 
candidate, at least during the first round of voting at the national 
convention. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Throughout early 2016, as Donald Trump amassed a commanding lead in 
the Republican presidential nomination process, many members of the 
Republican “establishment” tried to stop him from winning the 
nomination.1  By April of that year, it had become mathematically 
impossible for any candidate other than Trump to win a majority of bound 
delegates to the Republican National Convention through presidential 
primaries and caucuses.  Senator Ted Cruz and Governor John Kasich 
nevertheless remained in the race to try to prevent Trump from reaching a 
majority.2  Cruz also lobbied delegates to Republican state conventions to 
 
 1. See, e.g., Alexander Burns & Jonathan Martin, Facing Long Odds, G.O.P. Leaders 
Map Strategy to Derail Trump, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2016, at A1; Hilary Brueck, An Island 
Full of Millionaires Wants to Stop Donald Trump Cold, FORTUNE (Mar. 8, 2016, 8:45 AM), 
http://fortune.com/2016/03/08/aei-world-forum-trump/ [https://perma.cc/9A5K-4VXN]. 
 2. See James Hohmann, The Front-Runners Got Their Mojo Back in New York, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 21, 2016, at A15; Sahil Kapur, Cruz’s Path to the Nomination Narrows After 
New York Walloping, BLOOMBERG POL. (Apr. 20, 2016, 5:00 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2016-04-20/ted-cruz-s-path-to-the-nomination-
narrows-after-new-york-walloping [https://perma.cc/SME4-E9LU]. 
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select national convention delegates who supported him, even in states 
where he had lost the primaries to Trump.3 
Cruz and Kasich sought to force a contested convention at which they 
could claim the Republican Party’s nomination for President, despite failing 
to win the most bound delegates to the national convention, the national 
popular vote in the presidential primaries and caucuses, or a plurality of 
primaries and caucuses on a state-by-state basis.4  Even after Trump 
secured an absolute majority of bound delegates to the national convention, 
some opponents continued their efforts to derail his nomination by 
attempting to change the convention’s rules as it was convening—after all 
of the primaries were complete, votes cast, and delegates selected.5  One 
delegate to the Republican National Convention sued, successfully, to avoid 
having to vote for Trump.6 
The Democratic primaries did not run much more smoothly.  Former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s main opponent was Senator Bernie 
Sanders, a self-identified socialist who declared himself to be a Democrat 
for the sole purpose of seeking the party’s nomination for President7 and 
left the party immediately after losing.8  Months before the first primary 
was held, Clinton had secured the support of hundreds of “superdelegates,”9 
giving her a substantial advantage and causing Sanders’s supporters to 
 
 3. See Seema Mehta & Melanie Mason, Dual Strategies in 2 States for Cruz, L.A. 
TIMES, May 1, 2016, at A15; see also Dan Nowicki & Yvonne Wingett Sanchez, Trump 
Campaign Irate over Delegate Defeat in Arizona, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, May 1, 2016, at A6; 
Jenna Portnoy, Cruz Picks Up 10 Delegates to Trump’s 3 at State GOP Convention, WASH. 
POST, May 1, 2016, at C5. 
 4. See Election 2016—Republican Delegate Count, REALCLEARPOLITICS, 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2016/president/republican_delegate_count.html (last 
visited Nov. 19, 2016) [https://perma.cc/HBW2-WEN4]. 
 5. See Scott Detrow, “Never Trump” Campaign Launches Last-Ditch Effort to Stop 
Nomination, NPR (July 13, 2016, 4:35 PM), http://www.npr.org/2016/07/13/485895835/ 
opposition-forces-prepare-last-ditch-effort-to-thwart-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/9MEU-
EMHR]; Alexandra Jaffe, Campaign to Dump Trump at Republican Convention Emerges, 
NBC NEWS (June 17, 2016, 5:57 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-
election/campaign-dump-trump-republican-convention-emerges-n594766 [https://perma.cc/ 
24NY-VT6D]. 
 6. See Correll v. Herring, No. 3:16CV467, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89781 (E.D. Va. 
July 11, 2016). 
 7. See Stephanie McCrummen, The Most Radical Thing He’s Ever Done, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 6, 2016, at A1; see also Gabrielle Levy, Sanders:  Yes, I’m a Democrat of Convenience, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 15, 2016, 2:24 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/ 
articles/2016-03-15/sanders-yes-im-a-democrat-of-convenience [https://perma.cc/F4X5-6E 
GF]. 
 8. See Peter Nicholas, The Democratic Convention:  Sen. Sanders to Serve Term as 
Independent, WALL ST. J., July 27, 2016, at A5. 
 9. See Charles M. Blow, Opinion, The (Un)Democratic Party, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 
2016, at A19; Gabriel DeBenedetti, Leaked Memo Shows Clinton Campaign Still Sweating 
Bush, POLITICO (Oct. 28, 2015, 7:57 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/leaked-
memo-hillary-clinton-still-concerned-jeb-bush-215230 [https://perma.cc/D5MZ-8YSZ].  A 
“superdelegate” is a current or former Democratic Party official or officeholder who is 
automatically deemed a delegate to the Democratic National Convention by virtue of his or 
her position and is not bound, pledged, or otherwise required to vote for any particular 
candidate. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. 
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argue that the system was unfairly rigged against them.10  Indeed, as the 
Democratic National Convention was starting, the chair of the Democratic 
National Committee (DNC), Debbie Wasserman Schultz, was forced to 
resign after an email leak confirmed that she and several other senior 
leaders had manipulated the entire process to aid Clinton’s nomination.11 
These controversies reveal the internal contradictions and risks of 
disruption that permeate the presidential nominating process.  The process 
is an uncomfortable, ill-considered pastiche of two distinct components that 
typically operate in fundamentally different manners12:  selecting delegates 
to the national convention (generally done through state and district party 
conventions or other intraparty processes) and determining the presidential 
candidate for whom those delegates will vote (generally done through state-
by-state primaries and caucuses).13  These competing processes coalesce in 
the third critical component of the system:  the national party convention. 
The ritual of holding primary elections and caucuses across the nation 
creates the widespread public expectation that the results of those 
proceedings—the will of the voters—will determine who wins each party’s 
nomination.14  These public expectations are undoubtedly fueled in part by 
a lack of understanding of how the presidential nomination system works, 
due both to its complexity and the infrequency with which it is 
implemented.15 
The national convention, however, need not nominate the person who 
received the most primary or caucus votes nationwide, won the most 
delegates, or prevailed in the most primaries or caucuses.  Indeed, the 
convention may decide to nominate someone who did not even run in the 
primaries and caucuses at all.16  The process by which many delegates to 
the national convention are selected, the virtually plenary discretion those 
delegates have over the rules of the national convention, the highly 
circumscribed ways in which most delegates are bound by the results of 
 
 10. David Weigel, Superdelegates Emerge as Democrats’ Polarizing Force, WASH. 
POST, June 8, 2016, at A9; see, e.g., Editorial, Superdelegates, Clarify Your Role, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2016, at A18. 
 11. Jonathan Martin & Alan Rappeport, Leaks Bring Down a Democratic Leader, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 25, 2016, at A1. 
 12. See Zachary M. Bluestone, Note, The Unscripted Evolution of Presidential 
Nominations:  From Founding-Era Idealism to the Dominance of Party Primaries, 39 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 963, 998 (2016). 
 13. See infra Part I. 
 14. See, e.g., Blow, supra note 9, at A19. 
 15. Cf. Michael T. Morley, Dismantling the Unitary Electoral System?:  Uncooperative 
Federalism in State and Local Elections, 110 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE (forthcoming 2016) 
(manuscript at 19–20), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2742719 
(explaining how erroneous public assumptions and perceptions can give rise to conventions) 
[https://perma.cc/WA7L-NQQH]. 
 16. This possibility is typically referred to as the “white knight” scenario.  During the 
2016 Republican presidential nomination process, some commentators urged national 
convention delegates to nominate Paul Ryan or Mitt Romney, even though neither had run in 
the primaries or caucuses. See Alexander Burns, Who Could Save the G.O.P.?:  Republicans 
Weigh Some Ideas, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/14/us/ 
politics/republican-nomination.html [https://perma.cc/MUY7-JBBN]. 
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primaries, and the appointment of superdelegates who are not bound to vote 
for a particular candidate all conspire to create a system in which party 
elites may act as a check on the popular will and have the power to 
determine who receives the nomination.17  When it appears that the system 
may operate in this manner, however, public pressure and expectations seek 
to force the party to abide by the popular will.18 
In short, the system gives delegates substantial power over both the rules 
of the convention and the choice of nominee19 that, were it ever used, could 
lead to the collapse of a party.  The mere existence of this power, moreover, 
leads to suspicion of the party establishment, intrigue and internal discord 
by factions seeking to defeat the candidate who won the most popular 
support in the primaries and caucuses, and uncertainty and instability 
throughout the primary process that is unhealthy for both the national party 
and the country.20 
The system’s structure also reveals deep ambivalence over who actually 
constitutes “the party.”  “The party” may be understood broadly as 
including anyone who chooses to participate in that entity’s presidential 
preference primaries or caucuses; in this sense, a party can include people 
who have never supported that party’s candidates before and even members 
of a competing political party (in states with open primaries).  During the 
2016 election cycle, many independents tended to support Donald Trump, 
leading him to perform much better in open primaries than primaries with 
more restrictive participation standards.21 
Alternatively, “the party” can refer to party officials and officeholders, 
major contributors, and activists who loyally volunteer to assist campaigns 
for offices at all levels of government.22  Such people have personally 
 
 17. See infra Part I. 
 18. Donald Trump memorably predicted, “I think you’d have riots,” if he fell 100 
delegates short of a majority and was ultimately denied the nomination. See Mark Z. 
Barabak, 3 Ways the GOP May Pick Its No. 1, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 26, 2016, at A6.  A 
Bloomberg Politics survey revealed that 63 percent of Republican primary voters thought 
that “the person with the most delegates deserves the party’s nomination, even if he arrives 
short of a majority.” Id. 
 19. See Ross Douthat, Opinion, The Party Still Decides, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2016, at 
SR9. 
 20. See, e.g., Ed O’Keefe, As “Never Trump” Forces Make a Last Stand, Compelling 
Scenarios Emerge, WASH. POST, July 14, 2016, at A6; see also Ed O’Keefe, Anti-Trump 
Delegates Vow Trouble, WASH. POST, July 17, 2016, at A2. 
 21. See Janet Hook & Reid J. Epstein, Cruz, Sanders Get Big Wins, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 
2016, at A1. 
 22. Even the so-called “party establishment,” of course, does not necessarily act as a 
monolith.  V.O. Key Jr. explains that party leadership is comprised of the party-in-
government, or the officeholders who belong to the party, and party organization, referring 
to the party activists who engage in campaigning and fundraising. V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, 
PARTIES, & PRESSURE GROUPS 163–65 (5th ed. 1964).  “[B]oth sides of intraparty disputes 
usually include a varied mix of like-minded leaders from both the party organization and 
party-in-government, cooperating together against rivals along ideological lines.” Michael S. 
Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 170 (2005) 
(emphasis omitted).  Deep schisms can also exist between party officials and front-line 
activists. See Hans Noel, Ideological Factions in the Republican and Democratic Parties, 
667 ANNALS 166, 177–81 (2016). 
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invested in the organization and can perhaps lay greater claim to its long-
term stability, reputation, and interests.  In the 2016 primaries, these people 
tended to support so-called “establishment” candidates such as Governor 
Jeb Bush, Senator Marco Rubio, Kasich, and Clinton.23  The extent to 
which party elites should be able to overrule the will of others who 
participate in presidential preference primaries and caucuses lies at the heart 
of most disputes underlying the nomination process.24 
This Article contends that the structure of the presidential nomination 
system and the rules governing it introduce unnecessary instability and 
unpredictability into an already contentious system.  It offers basic 
proposals for reform that are consistent with nearly any conception of what 
a political party is and what the goals of the nomination process should be. 
Part I begins by describing the presidential nominating process, exploring 
each of its three main components:  the selection of delegates to the national 
convention (typically at state and district party conventions or through other 
intraparty processes), the determination of the presidential candidate for 
whom those delegates will vote (typically through state-level primaries and 
caucuses), and the actual selection of the party’s presidential nominee at the 
national convention.  This part further explains how the rules of the national 
convention determine key aspects of the overall presidential nomination 
process.  The most critical rules specify the requirements that a candidate 
must satisfy to be eligible for nomination at the national convention, the 
number of votes a candidate must receive at the convention to win the 
nomination, whether delegates must follow state laws and state party rules 
binding them to vote for particular candidates based on the results of their 
respective states’ primaries and caucuses, and whether the convention rules 
may be suspended altogether.  These rules, however, are not definitively 
 
 23. See Noel, supra note 22, at 171. 
 24. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 236 (1986) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the state’s interest in “protect[ing] the general party membership 
against . . . minority control” by the party’s officeholders and candidates). 
  The system also is poorly tailored to facilitating the selection of a nominee based on 
any particular criteria.  That is, there is no consensus as to whether a party should seek to 
nominate the person who best embodies the party’s principles, the person who is most likely 
to win the general election (which, from a public choice perspective, often means the person 
most likely to appeal to the “median voter”), or someone who reflects some optimal tradeoff 
between these competing considerations. See ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
DEMOCRACY 127–28 (1957).  As a result, the primaries and caucuses conducted in each state 
often work at cross-purposes with each other, and the national convention cannot effectively 
pursue any of those objectives.  States with closed primaries and caucuses privilege the 
views of party stalwarts. See Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 
450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981) (explaining that a national political party has a First Amendment 
right to hold closed presidential preference primary elections because the “inclusion of 
persons unaffiliated with [the] political party may seriously distort [the party’s] collective 
decisions”).  The outcomes of those contests are then diluted or nullified by other states’ 
open primaries, which encourage anyone—even members of other parties—to participate. 
See Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 221–25 (holding that a party has a First Amendment right to open 
its primary to independent voters, in part because their inclusion can help the party select a 
nominee who will appeal to the public); Nathaniel Persily, Toward a Functional Defense of 
Political Party Autonomy, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 750, 815 (2001). 
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determined until the convention itself, when the delegates vote to adopt the 
proposal of the convention’s rules committee. 
Part II argues that this system is fundamentally unstable, unfair, and 
politically undesirable.  The legal and practical effects of primaries and 
caucuses are not determined until the very end of the process, after they 
have concluded.  And those effects are determined by national convention 
delegates selected largely through state and district conventions, who may 
oppose the candidates who won their respective states’ primaries and 
caucuses.  The various components of the presidential nomination process 
thus do not fit smoothly together but instead foster uncertainty, intraparty 
intrigue, public distrust in the process, and the ever-present possibility that 
the results of primaries and caucuses will be undermined or ignored, such as 
through the nomination of a candidate who did not even participate in them. 
This part offers three main recommendations to political parties to 
enhance the stability, predictability, and perceived fairness of the 
presidential nominating process.  First, certain fundamental rules governing 
national conventions should be determined well in advance of the 
presidential nominating process, before any primaries or caucuses are held 
or delegates selected, and not be subject to change or suspension at the 
convention itself.  Second, parties can enhance the democratic moorings of 
their national conventions by amending their rules (which, as discussed 
above, should be established well in advance of the nomination process) to 
specify that a candidate cannot appear on the ballot at the national 
convention unless he or she has won a substantial number of primaries and 
caucuses.  National conventions should not have the power to completely 
disregard the millions of votes cast in primaries and caucuses, effectively 
nullifying that component of the process, by nominating someone who 
fared poorly or did not even participate in those contests. 
Third, and perhaps most controversially, the components of the 
nomination process should be tied more closely together by blending the 
current approaches of the Democratic and Republican Parties.  Each party 
should adopt a system in which, as the Democratic rules provide, candidates 
may reject individuals seeking to serve as national convention delegates 
pledged or bound to them.  Each party likewise should adopt the current 
Republican requirement that delegates allocated to a presidential candidate 
based on the results of a primary or caucus are bound to vote for that 
person, at least in the first round or two of voting at the national convention. 
This Article does not defend the existing convention-based framework 
for nominating presidential candidates.  Nor does it contend that its 
suggested reforms will perfect that system or resolve the enduring 
controversy over the proper allocation of power among party elites, the 
party’s rank and file, and people whose only connection to a party may be 
voting in its presidential primary.  Rather, this Article adopts a more 
practical perspective.  Recognizing that the current system is the product of 
numerous conflicting imperatives and promotes the interests of various 
stakeholders, this Article accepts the system’s structure as a given and 
suggests ways to minimize the possibility that intraparty conflict will 
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needlessly cripple a party’s nominee and undermine the fairness of a 
presidential election as a whole.25 
I.  THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION PROCESS 
The Democratic Party of the United States and the Republican Party of 
the United States are responsible for nominating candidates for President 
and structuring their respective nomination processes.  The national 
Democratic Party is governed by its Charter;26 the national Republican 
Party is governed by its Rules.27  The Democratic Charter and Republican 
Rules each establish a national committee to manage the party’s affairs 
between conventions and issue the call to the national convention.28 
The call to the 2016 Democratic National Convention recognizes four 
types of delegates to the national convention:  at-large delegates, district 
delegates, pledged election official delegates (PLEOs), and unpledged 
delegates (“superdelegates”), each of whom has an equal vote.29  The call 
allocates at-large delegates and district delegates (collectively referred to as 
“base delegates”) among the states based on a formula that takes into 
account each state’s number of votes in the Electoral College, as well as the 
total number of ballots cast within that state for the Democratic candidate 
for President in the past three elections.30  These base delegates become 
pledged to particular presidential candidates based on the outcome of the 
state’s presidential primary or caucus.31 
 
 25. Due to the limited scope of this Article, I must reserve an analysis of the proper role 
of judicial review in the presidential nomination process for future work. 
 26. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., Charter of the Democratic Party of the United States, in 
THE CHARTER & THE BYLAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES 1 (2015) 
[hereinafter Democratic Charter], http://s3.amazonaws.com/uploads.democrats.org/ 
Downloads/DNC_Charter__Bylaws_9.17.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TJT-75MU]. 
 27. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY (2016) [hereinafter 
REPUBLICAN RULES], https://s3.amazonaws.com/prod-static-ngop-pbl/docs/2016-Republican-
Rules-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9M5-S9GY]. 
 28. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., Bylaws, in THE CHARTER & THE BYLAWS OF THE 
DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES 11, art. II, § 1(a)–(c) (2015), http:// 
s3.amazonaws.com/uploads.democrats.org/Downloads/DNC_Charter__Bylaws_9.17.15.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3TJT-75MU]; Democratic Charter, supra note 26, art. III, § 1; 
REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, rr. 1(a), 13.  These documents also state that, if the 
national party rules, national convention rules, or actions of the national convention conflict 
with a state law, the party will disregard that conflicting law. Democratic Charter, supra 
note 26, art. II, § 2; see also REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, rr. 14(c), 16(b), 16(d)(3)–
(5). See generally Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) (recognizing that national party 
rules governing the presidential nomination process trump conflicting state laws). 
 29. DEMOCRATIC NAT’L COMM., CALL FOR THE 2016 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL 
CONVENTION art. I (2014) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL], http://tndp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/2016-Call-for-Convention-5.22.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/98W9-2J 
DN]. 
 30. Id. art. I(B).  Each state’s allocation of base delegates is increased by up to 35 
percent depending on when its presidential nomination events are scheduled to occur. Id. art. 
I(C)(2).  The term “state” is used broadly here to include the District of Columbia, as well as 
U.S. territories and possessions.  The call assigns jurisdictions that do not participate in the 
general election for President set numbers of base delegates in addition to the 3,200 divided 
among the states and District of Columbia. Id. art. I(E). 
 31. See infra Part I.A. 
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Each state also receives PLEO slots equaling 15 percent of its total 
allotment of base delegates for state, local, and party officials.32  PLEOs 
also become pledged to particular presidential candidates based on the 
results of the state’s primary or caucus “on the same basis as the state’s at-
large delegates.”33  Finally superdelegates automatically qualify as 
delegates to the national convention by virtue of their current or former 
positions and are not bound to particular candidates.  DNC members; 
Democratic federal elected officials and governors; and former Democratic 
Presidents, congressional leaders, and DNC chairs are all superdelegates.34  
A total of 4,763 voting delegate slots were authorized for the 2016 
Democratic National Convention:  2,650 district delegates, 910 at-large 
delegates, 491 PLEOs (making a total of 4,051 pledged delegates), and 712 
additional unpledged superdelegates.35 
The call to the Republican Convention contained a set of temporary rules 
that governed the nomination process until the convention convened and 
adopted them as standing rules.36  The temporary rules recognize three 
categories of delegates:  at-large delegates, district delegates, and party-
leader delegates.37  Each state receives ten at-large delegates,38 plus up to 
six bonus at-large delegates based on the number of its state and federal 
Republican officeholders,39 and additional bonus at-large delegates if the 
state voted for the Republican candidate for President in the previous 
election.40 
Each state also is allotted three district delegates for each of its 
congressional districts.41  Finally, each state receives three party-leader 
slots designated for particular people:  the state party chair, the Republican 
National Committee (RNC) committeeman, and the RNC 
committeewoman.42  Delegates are generally bound to particular 
presidential candidates based on the results of their state’s presidential 
 
 32. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. I(D); DEMOCRATIC NAT’L 
COMM., DELEGATE SELECTION RULES r. 8(D) (2014) [hereinafter DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE 
SELECTION RULES], http://www.demrulz.org/wp-content/files/Proposed_Draft-_2016_ 
Delegate_Selection_Rules_8_23_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CEX-K2ET]. 
 33. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 9(B)(2). 
 34. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. I(J); Democratic Charter, supra 
note 26, art. II, § 4(h). 
 35. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, app. B. 
 36. REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., CALL OF THE 2016 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION 
r. 42 (2015) [hereinafter REPUBLICAN CONVENTION CALL], https://prod-static-ngop-
pbl.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/Call%20of%20the%202016%20Convention_1448
920406.pdf [https://perma.cc/EKP5-4AXU].  Those temporary rules also are included in the 
Rules of the Republican Party. See REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 42. 
 37. REPUBLICAN CONVENTION CALL, supra note 36, r. 14(a). 
 38. Id. r. 14(a)(1).  Jurisdictions that are not states receive set numbers of at-large 
delegates, in addition to three party-leader delegates, but no district delegates. Id. r. 14(a)(4). 
 39. Id. r. 14(a)(6)–(7). 
 40. Id. r. 14(a)(5). 
 41. Id. r. 14(a)(3). 
 42. Id. r. 14(a)(2). 
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preference vote.43  Based on these formulas, the RNC authorized 2,472 
delegates to the 2016 national convention:  560 at-large delegates, 1,305 
district delegates, and 168 party leaders.44 
The parties’ presidential nomination processes are similar to each other.  
Each is comprised of three components:  (1) a method for determining how 
many national convention delegates will vote for each presidential 
candidate (typically through statewide presidential preference votes, such as 
primaries and caucuses), (2) a method for selecting delegates to the national 
convention (typically through state and district party conventions or other 
intraparty processes), and (3) the selection of a presidential nominee at the 
national convention itself. 
A.  Determining How National Convention Delegates 
Will Vote 
Most state parties determine how their delegates to the national 
convention will vote in the first, and sometimes later, rounds of voting by 
holding a presidential preference vote, which may be conducted through a 
primary election, caucuses throughout the state, or (rarely) a state party 
convention.45  The Democratic Party requires state parties to allocate their 
national convention delegates among presidential candidates based on the 
results of some sort of presidential preference vote.46  The rules of the 
Republican Party, in contrast, specify that if a state party chooses to hold a 
 
 43. See infra Part I.A; see also Memorandum from RNC Counsel’s Office to Republican 
Nat’l Comm. Members (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.scribd.com/doc/298879643/Counsel-s-
Office-Memo-re-RNC-Member-Binding [https://perma.cc/86YC-X7B6]. 
 44. REPUBLICAN CONVENTION CALL, supra note 36, at 47–58. 
 45. The District of Columbia Republican Party was the only entity in the 2016 election 
cycle that chose to hold a presidential preference vote at a “state” convention (at which it 
also selected its national convention delegates). D.C. REPUBLICAN PARTY, DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL CONVENTION AND DELEGATE SELECTION PLAN FOR 
THE 2016 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION §§ II(1), IV(1), V(1) (2015), 
http://dcgop.com/2016/wp-content/uploads/DCGOP-2016-Convention-Plan-i-FINAL-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4FXZ-KMR9]. 
  The Republican state parties of Colorado, North Dakota, and Wyoming did not hold 
presidential preference votes.  North Dakota held a statewide convention to select its national 
convention delegates, who were not bound to any presidential candidates. See infra Part I.B; 
see also N.D. REPUBLICAN PARTY, STATE COMMITTEE RULES rr. 11, 20 (2016), 
https://www.ndgop.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/NDGOP-State-Party-and-Convention-
Rules-April-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HCJ-SP7W]. 
  Colorado’s delegates were not bound to a particular candidate unless they chose to 
file pledge forms promising to support that candidate in the first round of voting at the 
national convention. COLO. REPUBLICAN STATE CENT. COMM., BYLAWS OF THE COLORADO 
REPUBLICAN STATE CENTRAL COMMITTEE art. XIII, § A(1)(a), (5)(c) (2015), http:// 
cologop.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/CRC-Bylaws-9-26-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3A 
R-B2EQ].  Wyoming selected some of its delegates at a statewide convention and others at 
county conventions. See WYO. REPUBLICAN PARTY, BYLAWS OF THE WYOMING REPUBLICAN 
PARTY art. IV, § 7(1)(b) (2016), https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/wygop/pages/44/ 
attachments/original/1474042400/2016.bylaws.pdf?1474042400 [https://perma.cc/8YFL-
9WYT]; id. art. VI, §§ 4(1)(d), 8(1), 8(4).  Candidates for national delegate in Wyoming 
were required to pledge themselves to a particular presidential candidate or declare 
themselves uncommitted. Id. art. VI, § 8(11). 
 46. See DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, rr. 10(C), 13(A)–(B). 
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statewide presidential preference vote through any of those methods, the 
results must be used to bind that state’s delegates to the national convention 
in some way (although the state may choose whether delegates are allotted 
to candidates on a winner-take-all or proportionate basis).47  States that 
choose not to hold statewide presidential preference votes, in contrast, are 
not required to bind their delegates.48 
State law generally governs the conduct of a state’s presidential 
preference vote, but if the law conflicts with the rules of a state or national 
party, that party often can compel compliance with its rules,49 subject to 
certain ill-defined constitutional50 and other limits.51  In states that hold 
their presidential preference votes through primary elections, candidates can 
qualify to appear on a party’s primary ballot in different ways.52  Some 
states automatically grant ballot access to anyone who is “generally 
advocated or recognized in national news media throughout the United 
States” as a candidate for President.53  Some allow, either in addition or in 
the alternative, the chair of each major state party to submit a list of 
presidential candidates for inclusion.54  Most states permit candidates to 
 
 47. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(a)(1). 
 48. Id.; see supra note 45. 
 49. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975) (holding that a national party 
convention had the First Amendment right to refuse to seat delegates who were elected 
pursuant to state law, on the grounds their election violated party rules); see also Eu v. S.F. 
Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 229–30 (1989) (holding that a state cannot 
regulate the “organization and composition of official governing bodies” of a political party); 
Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 126 (1981) 
(holding that a state law may not bind national convention delegates to vote in accordance 
with the results of a presidential preference primary conducted in violation of the national 
party’s rules). 
 50. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663–64 (1944) (holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits a state Democratic Party from excluding African-Americans from its 
primary elections, because the state’s involvement in conducting primaries makes the party 
“an agency of the State in so far as it determines the participants in a primary election”); cf. 
Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 573 (2000) (appearing to limit constitutional 
constraints on political parties to the prohibition of intentional de jure racial discrimination). 
 51. Eu, 489 U.S. at 231 (holding that “a state may enact laws that interfere with a party’s 
internal affairs when necessary to ensure that elections are fair and honest” and “impose 
restrictions that promote the integrity of primary elections”); see, e.g., Morse v. Republican 
Party, 517 U.S. 186, 228–29 (1996) (holding that a state party’s decision to impose a fee for 
voting in a presidential preference primary was subject to the preclearance requirements of 
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, rather than a constitutionally protected decision under the 
First Amendment); Am. Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974) (“[T]he State may 
limit each political party to one candidate for each office on the ballot and may insist that 
intraparty competition be settled before the general election by primary election or by party 
convention.”); cf. Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191, 197 n.12 (1979) (declining to address 
whether a state may both prescribe the composition of a state party’s central committee and 
require it to perform certain election-related tasks for the party, such as selecting its national 
convention delegates and presidential electors). 
 52. See generally Election 2016—Republican Delegate Count, supra note 4. 
 53. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 53, § 70E (2013); accord MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 8-502 
(West 2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-614 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-5-205 (2013); WIS. 
STAT. § 8.12 (2013). 
 54. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 103.101(2) (2014); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-193 (2013); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 53, § 70E.  In states that rely exclusively on this method, the state party 
leadership has virtually unreviewable discretion over whether a candidate may appear on the 
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qualify for the presidential preference primary ballot by submitting petitions 
signed by a few hundred or thousand party members from that state.55  
Several jurisdictions allow candidates to simply pay a filing fee.56 
Jurisdictions also vary greatly in terms of who may participate in a 
party’s presidential preference vote.57  Some states hold open primaries in 
which each voter chooses the party primary in which they will vote and 
need not formally join the party to do so.58  In semiopen primaries, each 
person has similar flexibility to choose the party primary in which they 
wish to participate, but the act of requesting a party’s ballot is treated as 
registering with, affiliating with, or promising to support that party.59  Other 
states hold closed primaries, in which only people who had previously 
joined the party may vote,60 or semiclosed primaries, in which both party 
members and independent voters may participate.61  Caucuses exhibit 
comparable variations.62 
Generally, the results of a state’s presidential preference vote determine 
the number of delegates from that state who will be pledged or bound to 
each presidential candidate at the national convention.63  The Democratic 
Party’s “Delegate Selection Rules” require each state party to allocate 
delegates proportionately among all presidential candidates who receive at 
 
presidential preference primary ballot, giving the institutional party establishment 
tremendous influence over the shape and course of the primary. See Duke v. Massey, 87 
F.3d 1226, 1234 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that David Duke was not entitled to appear on the 
ballot in Georgia’s presidential preference primary because the state party leadership decided 
to exclude him). 
 55. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-242(A)-(C) (2013); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
§ 5/7-11 (2013). 
 56. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 34-732 (2008); W. VA. CODE § 3-5-8(a)(1) (2013). 
 57. Some states establish the eligibility requirements for participating in presidential 
preference votes in their laws. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-467(B); FLA. STAT. 
§ 101.021.  Others expressly provide that each state party’s rules shall determine eligibility 
or take precedence over state laws concerning eligibility. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 17-13-
7(a), -101 (2013); ARK. CODE ANN § 7-7-307(a) (2011).  Even when state law determines the 
type of primary that will be used, state parties have a First Amendment right to insist that 
nonmembers be excluded. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574–75 (2000); 
Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Folette, 450 U.S. 107, 125–26 (1981).  
Conversely, a party may demand that the state allow independents to participate in its 
primary. See Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 225 (1986).  The First 
Amendment does not grant parties a comparable right, however, to demand that members of 
other parties be allowed to participate in their presidential preference votes. See Clingman v. 
Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 587 (2005).  In some states, whether as a matter of state law or the 
parties’ rules, both parties hold the same type of primary; in others, each party holds a 
different type of primary. 
 58. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 115.397 (2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-1010 (2013); 
see also GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-224(a). 
 59. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-115(b) (2013). 
 60. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 101.021; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-7(C) (2013). 
 61. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-467(B); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 53, § 37 (2013). 
 62. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 34-732 (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-3301(a)–(c), -3304 
(2013). 
 63. Some states allow voters to select “no preference” in the presidential preference 
vote, which would result in delegates being unbound to any particular candidate. See, e.g., 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 53, § 70E. 
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least 15 percent of the vote.64  At-large delegates and PLEOs must be 
allocated based on the statewide vote totals,65 while each congressional 
district’s delegates are allocated based on the results within that district.66 
The Republican Rules allow for much greater variation among 
Republican state parties.67  Many state parties allocate all of their delegates 
based solely on the results of the statewide vote.  Some use a winner-take-
all system, in which the presidential candidate who receives the most votes 
on a statewide basis receives all of that state’s delegates.68  Others allocate 
delegates proportionately among the candidates based on the results of the 
statewide vote,69 often only among candidates who receive at least a certain 
percentage of the vote, ranging from 10 to 20 percent.70 
Several Republican state parties have adopted a hybrid approach:  the 
modified winner-take-all format.  In such states, a candidate who wins more 
than a certain percentage of the statewide vote (typically, a majority) 
receives all of that state’s delegates; if no candidate reaches that threshold, 
delegates are awarded proportionally.71  Nearly two dozen state parties 
apply their winner-take-all, proportional, or modified winner-take-all 
systems separately to all of their delegates;72 at-large and party leader 
delegates are allocated based on statewide vote tallies, while district 
delegates are allocated based on the results within their respective 
congressional districts.73 
 
 64. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, rr. 10(C), 13(B), (E). 
 65. Id. r. 13(E). 
 66. Id. r. 13(B). 
 67. See generally REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., 2016 PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING PROCESS 
(2016), https://prod-static-ngop-pbl.s3.amazonaws.com/media/documents/2016%20 
PRESIDENTIAL%20NOMINATING%20PROCESS%20BOOK_1443803140.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/Y64D-9GZG]. 
 68. See, e.g., N.J. REPUBLICAN STATE COMM., RULES GOVERNING THE SELECTION AND 
ALLOCATION OF DELEGATES TO THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION r. 5 (2016), http:// 
www.state.nj.us/state/elections/2016-results/2016-delegate-selection-plan-republican.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S4AJ-ME9T]; REPUBLICAN STATE CENT. & EXEC. COMM. OF OHIO, 
REPUBLICAN STATE CENTRAL AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF OHIO PERMANENT RULES 
art. X, § 1(d) (2015), https://www.scribd.com/doc/305765837/Ohio-Republican-Party-Rules-
9-18-15 [https://perma.cc/XWS5-54YG]. 
 69. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN STATE CENT. COMM. OF IOWA, BYLAWS art. VIII, § 1 (2015), 
https://www.iowagop.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/RPI-Bylaws-Updated-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JF82-RAA3]. 
 70. See, e.g., KY. REPUBLICAN STATE COMM., OFFICIAL RULES OF THE REPUBLICAN 
PARTY OF KENTUCKY r. 8.04 (2011), http://rpk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Official-
Republican-Party-of-Kentucky-Rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/GF73-DCB2]. 
 71. See, e.g., MICH. REPUBLICAN STATE COMM., RULES FOR SELECTION OF DELEGATES 
AND ALTERNATES TO THE 2016 COUNTY, STATE, AND NATIONAL CONVENTIONS r. 19(C) 
(2014), http://www.migop.org/assets/files/Rules_for_the_Selection_of_Delegates_and_ 
Alternates.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG5K-JP9H]. 
 72. See, e.g., WASH. STATE REPUBLICAN PARTY, RULES FOR PRECINCT CAUCUSES AND 
FOR ELECTION OF DELEGATES TO THE STATE CONVENTION AND NATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
r. 37(A)–(B) (2015), http://seattlegop.org/2016_WSRP_rules.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7X8-E3 
M7]. 
 73. The Republican Rules specify that state parties that hold presidential preference 
votes before March 15, except for Iowa, New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada, must 
use this system. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(c)(1), (c)(3). 
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The parties also take very different approaches to what it means for a 
delegate to be allocated to a presidential candidate.  The call to the 
Democratic Convention specifies that delegates are merely “pledged” to 
particular candidates and does not provide a mechanism for enforcing those 
pledges at the convention.74  Again, much more variation exists among 
Republican state parties.75  In most states, a bound delegate is required to 
vote for the specified candidate only in the first round of balloting at the 
national convention.76  In many other states, binding extends only to the 
first two rounds of voting.77  A few state parties require their delegates to 
vote for candidates throughout all rounds of balloting, unless released by 
that candidate, or certain other contingencies occur.78  Binding applies only 
to voting directly on the party’s nomination for President; it does not extend 
to other matters that may impact the nomination indirectly, such as the rules 
of the convention, platform issues, or credentialing disputes. 
Some state rules do not specify how binding is enforced.  Others provide 
that, if a delegate votes contrary to his or her binding at the national 
convention, the chair of that state’s delegation must announce and report 
that vote as if it had been cast for the required candidate.79  The Republican 
Rules also act as a backstop to enforce state-level binding requirements.  
They require convention officers to treat delegate votes cast contrary to 
binding requirements in the applicable state party rules or statutes as if they 
had been cast for the proper candidate.80 
B.  Determining Who Will Serve 
as National Convention Delegates 
The second main component of the presidential nomination process is the 
selection of delegates each state party will send to its national convention.  
 
 74. See DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VIII, § F(3)(e); cf. id. 
art. VIII, § F(3)(c).  As discussed in the next section, the rules indirectly attempt to ensure 
that delegates vote consistently with their pledges by giving presidential candidates a limited 
right to approve the identity of delegates seeking to be pledged to him or her. See infra Part 
I.B. 
 75. See Reid J. Epstein et al., Republican Convention’s Delegate Math Explained, WALL 
ST. J. (May 5, 2016, 10:05 AM), http://graphics.wsj.com/elections/2016/rnc-convention-
delegates/ [https://perma.cc/UDE3-ET9P]; Jessica Taylor, Here’s a Round-by-Round Guide 
to a Contested GOP Convention, NPR (Apr. 21, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/ 
2016/04/21/474581419/heres-a-round-by-round-guide-to-a-contested-gop-convention 
[https://perma.cc/42U9-U7CJ]. 
 76. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-243(B) (2013); IDAHO CODE § 34-736 (2008). 
 77. See, e.g., REPUBLICAN PARTY OF TEX., GENERAL RULES FOR ALL CONVENTIONS AND 
MEETINGS r. 38, § 10(b) (2016), https://www.texasgop.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ 
2016-Rules-7.14.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HXW-HSDW]. 
 78. See, e.g., ALA. REPUBLICAN EXEC. COMM., 2016 PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE PRIMARY 
RESOLUTION para. 9 (2016), http://algop.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2016-Presidential-
Preference-Primary-Resolution.pdf [https://perma.cc/M88S-DBK3]. 
 79. See, e.g., id. 
 80. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(a)(2); see also id. rr. 37(b), 40(d).  In a 
conflict between a state party rule and a state law concerning binding, the state party rule 
would govern. See Correll v. Herring, No. 3:16-CV-467, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89781 
(E.D. Va. July 11, 2016); see also Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952). 
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This stage typically occurs within a state after the results of its presidential 
preference vote are known.  Both national parties’ rules require that at-large 
delegates be selected on a statewide basis, while district delegates must be 
selected on a district-by-district basis.81 
The Democratic Party requires that the district delegates to be pledged to 
each presidential candidate be chosen either through a primary election or a 
districtwide caucus or convention comprised of Democrats who have signed 
“statements of support” for that candidate.82  Most state Democratic parties 
opt for caucuses or conventions.  The main difference between these 
formats is that district caucuses are fairly open, while the participants at 
district conventions typically must be chosen at county or municipal 
conventions, caucuses, or meetings.83  Statewide delegates and PLEOs 
typically are selected either by the state party executive committee or at a 
special meeting of the district delegates, but they also may be chosen at a 
state convention.84 
Most Republican state parties select their at-large and district delegates at 
state and district party conventions, respectively.85  The state and district 
conventions may be held on the same day, in which case attendees from 
each district select their district delegates first, then reconvene to vote 
collectively on at-large delegates.86 
The Democratic Party allows presidential candidates to exercise much 
greater control than the Republican Party over the identities of delegates to 
be pledged to them.  Anyone wishing to run to serve as a delegate to the 
Democratic National Convention—regardless of how a state selects its 
delegates—must pledge his or her support to a particular presidential 
candidate or declare themselves uncommitted.87  Each presidential 
 
 81. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 8(C); REPUBLICAN 
RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(d)(9).  The Democratic rules allow district delegates to be 
allocated among, and chosen within, political subdivisions smaller than congressional 
districts. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 8(C). 
 82. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 12(G); see also infra 
notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
 83. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 12(G)–(H). 
 84. Id. rr. 9(C), 10(B). 
 85. See, e.g., id. rr. 10(C), 13(A)–(B).  Both at-large and district delegates to the 
Republican National Convention may be chosen by state and district party conventions, the 
state party committee, a primary election, or some other procedure already in use in that state 
(pursuant to a grandfather clause). REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(d)(1). 
 86. As noted earlier, both parties allow at least some national convention delegates to be 
both chosen and bound to particular presidential candidates through presidential preference 
votes (i.e., primaries). Cf. supra Part I.A.  In the Democratic Party, only district delegates 
may be selected through primaries. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 
32, r. 10(B); see id. r. 9(C).  In the Republican Party, both statewide and district delegates 
may be chosen through primaries. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(d)(1). 
  In these states, the name of each person seeking to become a delegate to the party’s 
national convention appears on the party’s primary ballots, along with the name of the 
presidential candidate to whom that potential delegate wishes to be pledged or bound 
(although some states allow a candidate for delegate to specify that he or she is 
“uncommitted” or holds “no preference”). See N.J. REPUBLICAN STATE COMM., supra note 
68, r. 5(B)(1)–(2). 
 87. DEMOCRATIC DELEGATE SELECTION RULES, supra note 32, r. 12(B). 
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candidate then reviews the list of national convention delegate candidates 
from that state seeking to be bound to him or her and may reject anyone 
they wish, so long as certain minimum numbers of delegate candidates 
remain.88 
Very few Republican state parties formally give presidential candidates 
influence over the selection of potential national convention delegates 
seeking to be bound to them.  Presidential campaigns sometimes engage in 
extensive whip operations at state and district conventions to ensure the 
election of national convention delegates who support them.89  
Additionally, in some jurisdictions, the ballots at the state and district 
conventions will indicate the candidates for delegate whom each 
Republican presidential candidate has endorsed.90 
C.  The National Convention 
During the late summer of each presidential election year, the 
Democratic Party and Republican Party each hold a national convention 
where they select their respective nominees for President.  Both parties’ 
conventions have a rules committee, to determine the convention’s rules, 
and a credentials committee, to resolve disputes concerning whether certain 
delegates were properly chosen.91  These committees have tremendous 
power over the course of the convention and are typically the focus of most 
efforts to manipulate a convention’s results. 
Each Democratic Convention committee is comprised of 162 “base” 
members, allocated among the states according to the same formula used to 
apportion base delegates, as well as an additional twenty-five PLEOs.92  
The DNC’s Executive Committee selects the PLEOs,93 chair, and vice chair 
for each committee,94 giving the institutional party substantial influence 
over the committees’ activities.  Each state’s committee slots are allocated 
among the presidential candidates according to either that state’s 
presidential preference primary results or the distribution of that state’s at-
large delegates.95  A presidential candidate may submit one or more names 
for each slot allotted to him or her;96 the national convention delegates from 
that state are required to select committee members from among those 
names.97  Thus, presidential candidates can effectively dictate the 
membership of each committee; the committee members they nominate 
need not even be convention delegates.98 
 
 88. Id. r. 12(D)–(E). 
 89. See, e.g., supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
 90. See, e.g., D.C. REPUBLICAN PARTY, supra note 45, § VII. 
 91. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VII; REPUBLICAN RULES, supra 
note 27, r. 41(a). 
 92. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VII(A)(1)–(2). 
 93. Id. art. VII(B)(2). 
 94. Id. art. VII(F)(1). 
 95. Id. art. VII(C)(1). 
 96. Id. art. VII(D)(2). 
 97. Id. art. VII(B)(1), (D)(2). 
 98. Id. art. VII(A)(3). 
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For the Republicans, each committee is comprised of two delegates from 
each state.99  The chair of the RNC appoints the committees’ chairs and 
cochairs.100  Each state’s national convention delegates decide among 
themselves which of them will serve on a committee.101 
Shortly before a national convention opens, the credentials committee 
prepares a proposed report, identifying everyone who should be recognized 
as a delegate to the convention and containing resolutions addressing any 
challenges to delegates’ elections or credentials.102  The secretary of the 
convention also prepares a temporary roll of convention delegates, listing 
the people who will be permitted to vote until the credentials committee 
report is approved as the permanent roll of the convention.103  The rules 
committee likewise convenes shortly before the convention to craft 
temporary rules to govern the convention until the delegates adopt 
permanent rules.104 
When the convention begins, the credentials committee report is brought 
to the convention floor.  Delegates on the temporary roll vote on the 
report,105 except a delegate may not vote if the report resolves a challenge 
to his own appointment.106  When the report is adopted, the delegates it 
identifies are deemed the permanent roll of the convention, entitled to vote 
on all subsequent matters.  Control of the credentials committee is 
important because, in a tight race, its recommended decisions can swing the 
majority from one presidential candidate to another. 
The rules committee report, containing the temporary rules of the 
convention, is then presented to the floor.  The delegates vote on whether to 
adopt them as permanent rules.107  A convention’s rules determine 
numerous key aspects of the nomination process. 
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RULES, supra note 27, rr. 22(a), 27(a). 
 106. DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION CALL, supra note 29, art. VIII(C)(1)(c); see REPUBLICAN 
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First, the rules set forth the requirements for a presidential candidate to 
have his or her name submitted to the delegates to be voted upon (“the 
Candidate Qualification Rule”).  The rules of the 2016 Democratic 
Convention require a candidate to submit a petition signed by at least 300 
delegates from at least six jurisdictions, with no more than fifty delegates 
from any jurisdiction.108  If a delegate attempts to vote for a candidate who 
has not been properly placed into nomination, that vote is counted as 
“Present.”109  The Republican Rules specify that a candidate may be placed 
in nomination if he or she “demonstrate[s] . . . support” from a majority of 
delegates from eight or more states, though that number is being reduced to 
five beginning with the 2020 convention.110 
Second, each party’s rules specify the percentage of votes a candidate 
must receive to be deemed that party’s nominee for President (“the 
Nomination Rule”).  The 2016 rules of both parties’ conventions require a 
candidate to receive the votes of a majority of convention delegates to win 
the nomination.111 
Third, the rules discuss how, if at all, delegates’ pledges or binding will 
be enforced (“the Binding Rule”).  The Democratic rules do not bind or 
otherwise compel delegates—including so-called “pledged” delegates—to 
vote for particular candidates.  They provide that a delegate’s vote must be 
counted “without regard to any state law, party rule, resolution or 
instruction binding the delegation or any member thereof to vote for or 
against any candidate or proposition.”112  The Democratic system seeks to 
avoid the need to bind delegates by ensuring that each candidate has the 
opportunity to approve delegates who wish to pledge themselves to him or 
her.113  This procedure creates a strong likelihood that delegates allocated to 
particular candidates will voluntarily choose to vote for their respective 
candidates at the national convention. 
The Republican Rules, in contrast, specify that a state’s delegates must 
be bound by any statewide presidential preference vote that occurs in a 
primary, caucus, or state convention, unless voters directly chose the 
delegates themselves in a primary.114  The basis upon which delegates are 
bound to candidates (i.e., proportional allocation or winner take all) is 
determined by either state party rules or state law.115  Likewise, the number 
of rounds of voting at the national convention in which the delegate must 
vote for a particular candidate, and the circumstances under which that 
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delegate may be released from his or her binding, are determined by the 
state party or state statute as well.116  Convention officials enforce this 
binding by announcing and recording each delegate’s vote based on the 
candidate to whom that delegate is bound; they are prohibited from 
“recogniz[ing]” a delegate’s vote if he or she votes contrary to his or her 
binding.117 
Fourth, both parties expressly authorize motions to suspend the rules, 
meaning that delegates may vote to ignore whatever convention rules they 
wish (“the Suspension Rule”).118  These rules collectively are the 
fundamental cornerstones of the presidential nomination process yet are not 
even determined until the end of that process, at the outset of the national 
convention. 
II.  REFORMING THE FUNDAMENTAL INSTABILITY 
OF THE NOMINATION PROCESS 
The presidential nomination process is fundamentally unstable and 
dangerously indeterminate in ways that foster intraparty discord and 
undermine public confidence.  First, the rules governing each party’s 
national convention, which determine the legal effects and other 
consequences of states’ presidential preference votes, are determined 
toward the very end of the nomination process.  Those rules are decided at 
the national convention itself after all the primaries and caucuses have been 
conducted, votes cast, and delegates chosen.  Second, those rules are 
determined by national convention delegates who, particularly in the 
Republican Party, may very well oppose the candidates who won their 
respective states’ primaries and caucuses.  Third, the overall structure of the 
system ultimately sends conflicting messages to the public about both the 
voters’ role and the democratic nature of the process:  votes are 
constitutionally protected and count in determining the nominee,119 but they 
are only protected to the extent party elites decide they should. 
Determining the rules and consequences of presidential preference votes 
after they already have been held raises serious fairness and due process 
implications.120  Moreover, because the beneficiaries of various potential 
rules are definitively known at the time those rules are being considered, 
they are likely to be crafted almost exclusively for the political benefit of 
particular candidates rather than to promote procedural fairness or other 
values.121 
 
 116. See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. 
 117. REPUBLICAN RULES, supra note 27, r. 16(a)(2); see also id. rr. 37(b), 40(d). 
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Additionally, under the rules of the Republican Party in particular, the 
disconnect between the processes used for selecting delegates (typically, 
party conventions) and the processes used for allocating them to particular 
candidates (typically, primaries and caucuses) fosters intraparty discord.  
Candidates who fared poorly in primaries and caucuses and were not 
allocated many bound delegates may nevertheless continue pursuing their 
candidacies by seeking the election of supportive national convention 
delegates at state and district party conventions.122 
State and district conventions operated by party officials and open only to 
party insiders are the least transparent and publicly accessible part of the 
presidential nomination process.  Yet presidential candidates have a strong 
incentive to attempt to take advantage of them to undermine the results of 
primaries and caucuses.123  The components of the presidential nomination 
process are thus at war with each other, fostering unnecessary and 
destabilizing uncertainty over whether, and the extent to which, the 
outcomes of ongoing primaries and caucuses matter.  Rank-and-file party 
members, independents, and even members of other parties invited to 
participate in open primaries and caucuses justifiably may feel that party 
elites are using them to give a veneer of democratic legitimacy to the 
nomination process only to the extent it is perceived to be useful. 
Much of the problem stems from the fact that the presidential nomination 
process was not rationally designed as a coherent whole but rather reflects a 
series of accumulated changes and reforms meant to address particular 
problems as they arose.  Consequently, it fuses fundamentally different 
ways of nominating political candidates—primaries and caucuses on the 
one hand, party conventions on the other124—into a patchwork with poorly 
stitched seams that are likely to split under pressure.  However, assuming 
that the system’s overall structure is unlikely to radically change in the 
foreseeable future, political parties can enhance the fairness and stability of 
the presidential nomination process in the following ways. 
A.  Entrenching Certain Convention Rules 
Most basically, certain fundamental rules governing national conventions 
should be determined well in advance of the presidential nomination 
process, before any votes are cast or delegates selected.  Regardless of 
whether constitutional due process restrictions govern national conventions, 
fundamental fairness demands that the requirements for winning be 
established before an election is held, the votes are cast, and the specific 
candidates who will benefit from different possible standards are 
definitively known.  Neither the public, the candidates, nor the party itself 
should have to worry about the national convention delegates changing the 
rules at the last minute to facilitate the election of a candidate who did not 
 
 122. See, e.g., supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra note 16. 
 124. See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 205–06 (2008) 
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fare well in the primaries or, potentially, did not even run in the primaries at 
all.  The mere possibility of such machinations fosters uncertainty, 
intraparty intrigue, and the appearance of manipulation, which are 
unhealthy for the party and undermine confidence in the presidential 
election process. 
In particular, the following rules should be determined in advance of a 
presidential nomination cycle and not subject to change at any point during 
that cycle, including at the national convention:  the requirements a 
candidate must satisfy to be placed into nomination and receive votes from 
delegates at the national convention, whether state party rules and laws 
pledging or binding delegates to vote for certain candidates will be enforced 
and the manner in which they will be enforced, the percentage of votes at 
the national convention a candidate must receive to win the nomination, and 
a prohibition on suspending the rules of the convention. 
This reform can be accomplished in two different ways.  Most simply, a 
national convention in one presidential election cycle can be empowered to 
approve the rules for the following convention.  Under this approach, each 
convention would be governed by the rules adopted at the preceding 
convention.  This approach would cause the least disruption to the current 
system.  Presently, when a national convention adopts a set of rules, they 
take effect on the first day of the convention and expire the day before the 
following convention starts.125  This proposal would simply shift that 
timeline by four days; when a national convention adopts a set of rules, they 
should take effect the day after the convention ends, and expire the last day 
of the following convention.  Alternatively, certain basic rules concerning 
the selection of presidential candidates at national conventions can be 
included in the organic documents of the national parties themselves, such 
as the Democratic Charter.  Such rules would be placed above the fray of 
ordinary convention debate and would not be subject to change at the 
convention. 
B.  Reforming Convention Rules 
Political parties should do more to enhance the democratic underpinnings 
of the national conventions.  Presently, if no candidate goes into the 
convention with a majority of delegates pledged or bound to vote for him or 
her, the convention’s outcome becomes radically indeterminate.  Once the 
convention proceeds past the first round of voting, most delegates become 
unbound, allowing them to vote for any candidate who is eligible to be 
nominated. 
Currently, a candidate may appear on the convention ballot if he or she 
wins the presidential preference votes in only six states under the 
Democratic rules126 and is supported by a majority of delegates from eight 
states under the Republican Rules,127 and that number is set to drop to five 
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at the next Republican National Convention.128  But the convention remains 
free to change or suspend the rules concerning both delegate binding and 
the requirements for candidates to be placed into nomination at the 
convention.  Thus, delegates to the national convention have the power to 
nominate a presidential candidate who did poorly in the primaries and 
caucuses or did not participate in them at all. 
Parties can enhance the stability and democratic underpinnings of their 
national conventions by amending their rules to specify that a candidate is 
not eligible to receive the nomination unless he or she won substantial 
public support in presidential preference votes (generally, primaries and 
caucuses).  The simplest way of implementing this change is to specify that 
a candidate must have received the plurality of the vote in a significant 
number of presidential preference contests—perhaps a figure between 
twelve and fifteen—to be eligible for nomination. 
The notion that a person can secure a party’s nomination for President of 
the United States while losing up to forty-two primaries and caucuses 
undermines the democratic legitimacy of the nomination system and 
threatens to rend the connection between primaries/caucuses and the 
outcome of the national convention.  Of course, alternate ways of 
measuring public support can be devised instead.  For example, a candidate 
can be required to win a certain percentage of the total popular vote across 
all primaries and caucuses or a certain number of bound and pledged 
delegates (perhaps 20 percent of the total delegates) to be placed into 
nomination. 
Even if a party’s primaries and caucuses are not intended to be absolutely 
determinative of that party’s presidential nomination process, the very act 
of allowing tens of millions of people to participate in them suggests that 
their outcomes should at least have a substantial impact on determining the 
party’s nominee.  Limiting the field of potential nominees to those who 
have won widespread support through the primaries and caucuses helps 
achieve this delicate balance.  And once parties have settled on a revised 
rule, it should be locked in well in advance of a presidential nomination 
process—as suggested in the previous recommendation—rather than being 
left open to revision at the outset of a convention.129 
C.  Selection of National Convention Delegates 
Finally, the components of the nomination process should be tied more 
closely together by blending the current approaches of the Democratic and 
Republican Parties.  Each party should adopt a system in which, as the 
Democratic rules provide, the candidate(s) who prevail in a presidential 
preference vote have the right to veto any delegates who may be pledged or 
bound to them under state party rules or state law.130  Each party should 
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likewise adopt the Republican Party’s requirement that national convention 
delegates allocated to a particular presidential candidate based on the results 
of a presidential preference vote be bound to vote for that candidate to the 
extent required by state party rules or state law.131  Votes cast contrary to a 
candidate’s binding should be treated as if they had been cast properly.  
These measures not only would reduce the friction between competing 
components of the presidential nomination process but would also ensure 
that the tens of millions of votes cast in primaries and caucuses are not 
effectively nullified through backroom convention machinations. 
CONCLUSION 
The 2016 election cycle revealed numerous fundamental flaws at the 
heart of the presidential nomination process that came close to undermining 
both major parties’ conventions.  Establishing certain key rules concerning 
the presidential nomination process in advance, requiring presidential 
candidates to receive a greater level of public support in primaries and 
caucuses to be eligible to receive the nomination, and more closely tying 
the selection of national convention delegates to the results of presidential 
preference votes would strengthen the nomination system, improve its 
legitimacy, and reduce the possibility of intraparty schisms. 
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